Thank you very much, Heiner, for this very kind introduction.

As you can see, the vertically challenged, as I have just learned, are accommodated in

this venue.

As Heiner just pointed out, this panel's topic is very challenging, and I would add from

both a theoretical and a practical point of view.

Both religious freedom and gender equality are in themselves highly complex human rights,

much more so in their relationship with each other.

Religious freedom is contingent upon historical developments in geographical areas and may

vary considerably over time and geographically.

Gender equality, or rather gender inequality, is in my view one of the most persistent and

omnipresent societal problems in the world and the root cause of many other human rights

problems.

The relationship between religious freedom and gender equality is for the most part strenuous,

and not least because religious beliefs are often based on a disregard, disrespect, or

downright denial of gender equality.

When trying to discuss such a complex human rights question as the relationship between

religious freedom and gender equality, I find it useful to start with a typology of possible

conflicts.

A typology can be helpful to disentangle aspects of complex conflicts and provide an opportunity

to discuss more precisely.

This is what I will present in my introductory remarks.

I will distinguish four aspects of the conflicts between religious freedom and gender equality.

Firstly, there are the ordinary or classic liberal conflicts between individuals and

public authority, especially state authority.

Individuals and groups can claim from public authorities protection and respect for both

their religious freedom and gender equality, and also public authorities may have a duty

to bring about and foster equal religious freedom and gender equality in society.

However, neither the individual citizens and groups nor the state are homogeneous.

A closer look reveals intricacies and inherent contradictions on both sides.

Public authorities do not exist as ontological entities but are made up of individual persons

who may have their own religious beliefs.

It is therefore secondly interesting what conflicts between rules for public offices

and the individual persons holding these offices exist and how they can be reconciled.

How should the religious convictions of officials be reconciled with their duty to perform on

behalf of a public authority?

I will then thirdly look into the special status that is granted to churches and religious

communities in many constitutions.

Even though factually these churches and religious communities may wield tremendous societal

influence, for example as employers in social services, it is important to bear in mind

that they are not in themselves part of the state but are individual parties vis-a-vis

the state and should not be exempt from general anti-discrimination law.

Fourthly and finally, there are conflicts between private parties in which religious

freedom and gender equality clash directly.

Public authorities act as arbiters in these conflicts.

I start with classical liberal conflicts between individuals or groups and public authorities.

They seem to be trivial compared to the usually multipolar conflicts that characterize the

relationship between religious freedom and gender equality.

However, sometimes both come together in a classic liberal conflict.

That is the case in headscarf regulations if the state prohibits women from wearing

headscarves in public as France did.