In order to prepare our discussions with members of the African, the Inter-American and the European Court of Human Rights,

we made an in-depth analysis of leading cases of each system.

When debating common approaches and divergences in the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Courts and commissions,

we looked at and distinguished between a. normative principles in controlling the legitimacy of state interferences,

b. types of state interferences in corresponding human rights duties, and c. the methods applied.

To anticipate one of the main findings of our comparison, one can say that there is a fundamental accordance in the case law of the judicial bodies

when it comes to the points a and b.

The bodies are confronted with very similar types of state interferences and apply very similar normative principles when controlling the legitimacy of state interferences.

By contrast, on the level of methods applied, one can discern some differences and particularities in the jurisprudence of the courts and commissions we looked at.

On the level of normative principles, especially guiding the judicial control of whether state interferences can be justified, the three regional courts apply a very similar approach.

In their jurisprudence, the courts have established that the journalistic contribution to public and especially political debates is of core democratic relevance, and this function can be summarized by calling the press a public watchdog.

The freedom of press means creating pluralistic opinions within society. Strongly connected to the mentioned democratic function of the media, the different human rights instruments also protect journalistic opinions that are troubling, shocking, or of social relevance.

However, the possible shocking dimension of journalistic contributions is not unlimited. For example, the European Court of Human Rights found that the denial of Holocaust, as it is clearly based on racist objectives, does not fall under the scope of protection of Article 10 of the Convention.

In line with this argumentation, the court consequently developed the doctrine of responsible journalism. This doctrine concretizes the duty of journalists to act lawfully and in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable information.

With regard to judicial review of the proportionality of restrictions, the European and Inter-American Court adopted a concurring approach in the judgments we analyzed.

Both courts ruled that the freedom of press has to be balanced with conflicting individual rights and interests. While persons of public interest, such as politicians or actors, enjoy a lower level of protection, the interests of private citizens have to be respected by journalists.

When analyzing the different types of state interferences, we discovered that the courts are similarly confronted with state interferences concerning both the negative as well as the positive dimension of freedom of press.

A violation of the duty to respect, that is, of the negative dimension, exists when state interferences, such as restrictive laws, criminalizing journalism or forcing to identify journalistic sources, compulsory accreditation of journalists, disconnection or control of the Internet and of social media, or other forms of state censorship, occur.

The positive duty under the freedom of press is violated when state authorities fail to protect journalists from physical attacks of other private citizens or when the state fails to effectively investigate cases of missing or killed journalists.

It was established in the jurisprudence of all three regional human rights courts that the danger of so-called chilling effects exists in both scenarios.

The chilling effect is particularly high if states fail to actively protect the life or physical integrity of journalists.

Here the state's omission can cause fear and anxiety in media circles, but chilling effects can also occur if the confidentiality of journalistic sources is endangered or if domestic courts set too high standards of proof with regards to the veracity of facts reported.

It is obvious how this danger of intimidating chilling effects can be avoided with regards to a state's duty to respect. State authorities simply have to refrain from actively interfering with the freedom of press.

It is, by contrast, much more difficult to concretize the duty to actively protect the freedom of the media.

The courts have developed different approaches to concretize this duty to protect the freedom of press in cases where, additionally to the violation of the freedom of the press, the physical integrity of life or life of a journalist was at stake.

In such constellations, state authorities are obliged to effectively investigate and focus on recurrent patterns of violence against journalists in order to draw necessary lines of investigation.

Furthermore, if law enforcement bodies are informed of a real and imminent threat, they have the duty to take sufficient protective measures in order to save the life of the journalist concerned.

By contrast to this quite clear duty to protect when the lives of journalists are threatened, we found little information on what the duty to protect media freedom means beyond these particular cases.

Does a state, for example, have the duty to protect media pluralism by reducing media monopolies? How much money does the state have to spend in order to create a pluralistic landscape?

On the level of methods, our case law analysis produced clearer results.

In assessing the necessity for restrictions on freedom of press, both the European and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights concede a limited margin of appreciation to national authorities.

This limitation of the discretion of domestic authorities is justified in cases where political debate is of core relevance for democratic exchange or a debate is on matters of public interest.

Although the primary responsibility for balancing conflicting rights or for assessing public safety is up to national authorities, the courts do not refrain from carrying out an independent determination of the necessity of state interferences.

Another method dominantly applied by the African Commission and the African Court of Human and People's Rights is making references to the jurisprudence of the other regional or international human rights bodies and instruments.

To some degree, the African Court thereby creates international homogeneity of freedom of press beyond regional differences.

In the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, we discern some kind of emancipation process.

In a decision from 2004, the court had developed doctrinal principles on freedom of press by extensively referring to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

By contrast, in a decision from 2008, the court renounced from a similar reception of the European case law and consequently adopted a core Inter-American approach.

We experience the reference to the findings of other judicial human rights bodies as a method to contribute to the development of convergent case law, regardless regional particularities, and as a tool to strengthen universal principles.

On the other hand, when quoting other courts' decisions extensively, a regional human rights court runs the risk of neglecting particularities of the legal instruments it is supposed to apply.

We discussed this methodical aspect of referencing, especially with regards to the African system.

A question we came across was especially whether the African institutions overlook particularities of the Banjo Charter when reviewing if a state interference can be justified.

Similar to the Inter-American and European Court, the African institutions also review if an interference follows a legitimate aim, has a statutory basis, and was necessary in a democratic society.

Such a restriction is neither contained in the text of Article 9 of the Banjo Charter nor Article 66 of the ECOWAS Treaty, which guarantees the right of journalists.

The only written source for the criteria of justification that the African institutions apply is the non-binding Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, drafted by the African Commission.

Although the Commission is called upon to effectuate and concretize human rights standards of the Banjo Charter, we were wondering if this European-style approach that is not officially adopted by the contracting states of the Charter helps to increase the acceptance of the African human right to freedom of press.