Well, I am deeply honored to have been invited to speak here this evening, and I'm affected
by Laura's very generous introduction that is possibly the most thorough introduction
I have ever received on any occasion.
It will be very hard to live up to such high expectations, and all I can do is try my best
and see if I can induce in you a sense of metaphysical jet lag.
I'm the one who just flew in overnight, so maybe I have physical jet lag, but I'm going
to try and induce a sense of metaphysical jet lag, which is a state of mind that both cultural
psychologists and scholars of religion might find appealing, or at least astonishing, and
it's certainly the way I often feel when I take a long trip to my field site in Orissa,
India.
With regard to that reference to controversial or provocative, I can't resist recounting
that I had a brother-in-law years ago who did a residency in the medical specialty of
dermatology, and he said to me once, you know, Rick, you only have to know two things to
do dermatology.
If it's dry, make it wet.
If it's wet, make it dry.
I told that to an anthropological friend, Ted Schwartz, who said to me, well, Rick, you
know there are only two things you need to do to do anthropology.
If someone asserts it, deny it.
If someone denies it, assert it.
And lo and behold, I actually teach a seminar at the University of Chicago occasionally
called if someone asserts it, deny it.
Some title is Critical Reason and Political Correctness in the Social Sciences, and we
try to take so-called received truths and examine them carefully.
It's a kind of Socratic experience.
As some of you know, I'm a cultural anthropologist.
You've learned that in this introduction.
I'm also, however, what I've called a confusionist.
This is not to be confused with confusionist.
This is a confusionist.
What is confusionism?
Its central maxim is the following.
The knowable world is incomplete if seen from any one point of view, incoherent if seen
from all points of view at once, and empty if seen from nowhere in particular.
That means the choice in life and in science is between incompleteness, incoherence, and
emptiness.
And when presented with that choice, I can't opt for incoherence.
Emptiness is too dehumanizing a distance for me.
So incompleteness is what I opt for, which means staying on the move between different
points of view.
The analogy might be sitting on a branch and starting to saw the branch you're sitting
on, but looking while you're sitting on that branch, not just doing the deconstructive
work, but doing the constructive work of seeing what you can see from that particular perspective.
Then the branch goes.
You go to another branch.
I happen to think it's eternal free fall, that you will never hit the ground, but I try
to stay on the move.
Now one of the most fundamental questions in the study of morality and religious ethics
is this one.
Why do the many peoples of the world disagree with each other in their concrete moral judgments,
Presenters
Prof. Dr. Richard A. Shweder
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01:12:00 Min
Aufnahmedatum
2011-09-11
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2011-11-05 17:36:28
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The cultural anthropologist and cultural psychologist asks in the context of the first conference of the Center for »Anthropology of Religion(s)« of the Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg from 11thto 14thSeptember 2011 why do the many people of the world disagree with each other in their concrete moral judgments and why do not those judgments possess the universality that is characteristic of the idea of truth. To answer these questions is according to Shweder important for the question how to deal with cultural difference in morality and religious ethics as well as traditions to avoid cultural conflicts in multicultural and multireligious societies. Contrasting his findings of his field works in the temple town Bhubaneswar in the Indian state Orissa with the findings of interviews from the USA about the status of moral judgments and its validity he proposes, in regard of the status of moral judgments, to see the differences as universalism without uniformity.